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On this occasion we celebrate and deliberate the publication twenty years ago of 
Robert Witkin’s “The Aesthetic Imperative of  a Rational-Technical Machinery.” It is 
a  striking  and  richly  textured  essay.  Witkin  weaves  together  ambitious  abstract 
thinking,  which takes off  from the tradition of  critical  social theory,  with a fine-
grained  sensibility  closely  attuned  to  the  aesthetic  dimension  of  everyday  and 
organizational life. 
Witkin’s  general  theoretical  formulations  are  highly  original.  Against  structuralism 
and reductionism, he insists on the significance of  the subject, on taking account of 
social  actors’  internal  sensibilities.  He  employs  ethnomethodological,  and  more 
broadly  phenomenological  language  to  describe  how  social  structure  must  be 
contingently accomplished, how it must be acted upon emotionally and interpretively 
by sensate human beings, not just accepted, internalized and delivered as a habitus 
with the one-way directions of  social structure remaining intact. 
To create such a reference to autonomous subjectivity is to conceive action in a non-
rational  way,  to  filter  social  structural  determinism  via,  in  Witkin’s  words,  the 
“‘understanding’ that is uniquely afforded the subject.” Presuppositions about action 
must be connected with conceptions of  social order. The element of  collective order 
that Witkin correlates with his emphasis on sensate, emotionally intelligent action is 
aesthetic form. The “aesthetic imperative” is what affords an actor the “intelligence 
of  feeling.” To describe the structure of  this aesthetic collective order, Witkin draws 
upon the world of  art and music. To discover the aesthetic order, sociologists must 
investigate  “rhythm,  pitch,  dynamics,  dissonances  and harmonics… color,  texture 
and tonal (light and shade) values.”
This is a new, more aesthetic oriented take on the presuppositions about action and 
order that structure every social theory and empirical study. Typically, the theoretical 
logic that opposes rationality and economism/organizational-ism derives from moral 
or discursive theories. The great interest of  this aspect of  Witkin's paper (Witkin I) is 
the effort to reach beyond these standard cultural-sociological alternatives. Almost 
three  decades  before  recent  “strong  program”  forays  into  iconicity  (Alexander 
2008ab), Witkin I finds a way to conceptualize in the theoretical and empirical terms 
of  social science the legacy of  aesthetic philosophy, practice, and criticism. Witkin’s 
contribution  is  far  from being  merely  at  the  level  of  theoretical  logic.  He  goes
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beyond the  programmatic,  filling  his  essay  with subtle  empirical  observation  and 
interpretation,  reading  the material  surface interiors  of  Unilever  and the  sartorial 
exteriors of  its employees in a manner that powerfully reveals and communicates the 
feeling-sense  of  their  aesthetic  forms  and  formulations.  They  are  flat,  they  are 
colorless, they are geometric, they separate the head from the body. 
But when Witkin specifies these presuppositions and interpretations into a model of 
empirical causality, the invigorating sense of  actor subjectivity and intriguing interest 
in the independence of  aesthetic order fade away. Here he (Witkin II) clearly suggests 
that the effect of  the Unilver aesthetic is to prepare the subject-worker to acquiesce 
to organizational efficiency, to the soulless iron cage of  the possibly capitalist but 
certainly utterly bureaucratic office machine. If  this is so, then the autonomy of  the 
subject is only apparent, and the independence of  the aesthetic order illusionary and 
epiphenomenal. According to Witkin I’s general theoretical proposal, if  the aesthetic 
dimension is not given real independence from the objective order, the subject is 
doomed to be conceptualized in a merely passive, behavioral and adaptive way. If 
taking the aesthetic order into account means, however, only that we learn how the 
subject is reduced to being flat, affectless, and adaptive, the significance of  Witkin I’s 
theoretical move is neutralized. Why should we theorize the aesthetic dimension in 
modern life  and actor  subjectivity  if,  in  practice,  they  function only  to reinforce 
objective order from the outside? 
In his model of  empirical causality, Witkin II ties the aesthetic order very tightly to 
the  organizational-cum-economic.  From  such  a  statement  as  the  “aesthetic 
dimension is integral to the substantive relations of  organizational life” – a weak 
causal statement that suggests no one-way determination – Witkin moves to a much 
stronger, more deterministic one: “Physical artifacts play an important role… in their 
power  to  reflect  and  cue these  demand  characteristics.”  He  reiterates  this  more 
mechanical formulation as the paper proceeds: “Organizations… have a real interest 
in ensuring that they call out a presence in their members that is appropriate in the context of  
their  objectives… The design  of  organizational  artifacts  calls  out  in  the  subject a  certain 
presence… Organizations differ in their purposes, in their environments, and in their 
cultural  contexts.  These  differences  are  reflected  in  the  design of  artifacts.”  When 
Witkin  asks  about  “the  aesthetic  correlates of  rational-technical  machinery,”  he 
answers that “the modernist designer may be said to have made a virtue out of  the  
necessity  imposed  by  the  conditions of  mass  production  and  mass  consumption”  by 
“adapting, culturally, to modern metropolitan life by metaphorically appropriating the 
machine and the mechanical environment.” He concludes that “the development of 
an organization as a rational-technical machinery  gives rise to an aesthetic imperative 
characterized by… familiar elements of  the modernist design.” (All italics added)
Witkin I develops a theoretical logic that challenges “the flight from the aesthetic,” 
formulating conceptions of  action and order that challenge determinism in the name 
of  subjective  independence  and  (relative)  cultural  autonomy.  This  strong  and 
vigorous art-sociology adumbrates and complements the strong program in cultural 
sociology today, especially its forays into music and art (Eyerman 2008, McCormick 
2009). Witkin II seems to propose an empirical model of  organizational aesthetics 
that contradicts the spirit of  Witkin I. 
The problem can be illuminated by engaging in a thought experiment. How would 
one respect the “autonomy” of  the visual forms that Witkin identifies at Unilever? 
One could do so only by acknowledging that these shapes are not determined by the 
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necessities of  the organizational machine, that they could, in fact, vary independently 
from them. I think a case can be made that the flatness and geometric quality of  the 
Uniliver aesthetic is part of  the post-impressionist aesthetic tradition that begins with 
Cezanne and goes on to Cubism and then Bauhaus. This aesthetic was determined 
not by capitalism or by organizational needs for efficiency, but by internal emotional-
cum-aesthetic  developments  that  responded  to  strains  and  breakthroughs  in  the 
culture, psychology, and society of  the fin-de-siècle period itself. Witkin seems clearly 
to  acknowledge  this  possibility  at  one  point.  Referring  to  arguments  that  strictly 
correlate  the  aesthetic  he  has  identified  at  Unilever  with  macro-social  structure, 
Witkin  I  asserts  that  “such  explanations  neither  exhaust,  nor  even  confront, 
adequately, the meaning of  the revolution in design [which] represented a profound 
cultural shift that could hardly be reduced to the exigencies of  managing paper.” But 
Witkin II seems immediately to back away. He writes approvingly of  Hauser’s social 
deterministic  approach  to  style.  Yet  Hauser’s  base-superstructure  argument  that 
modern  capitalism,  with  its  urban  middle  class,  “produced”  individualism  and 
naturalism makes exactly the opposite empirical argument to Witkin II. Can modern 
capitalism and organizational rationalization produce both geometric abstraction and 
volumetric naturalism at the same time? Only if  notorious last instance arguments 
are evoked: the idea of  the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism – worked out 
after the publication of  Witkin’s essay – represents a striking argument of  this kind.
Would  it  seem  outrageous  if  I  were  to  suggest  that  the  feeling-cum-aesthetic 
intelligences of  Victorians, on the one hand, and mid-twentieth century moderns, on 
the  other,  were  shaped  and  caused  by  something  other  than  economic  and 
bureaucratic organization? To Witkin II, it would, but not to Witkin I. It was at the 
height of  pre-war World War I capitalism – which supposedly called forth naturalism 
(Hauser) and realism (Lukacs) – that the great aesthetic breakthroughs to a (new kind 
of) modernism emerged. And, to contest Witkin II more directly, it was in the very 
midst of  Unliver’s supposedly objectively necessary geometricism that there emerged 
Pop painting and Robert Venturi’s  Learning from Las Vegas, laying out a postmodern 
architectural aesthetic. They were both still very flat indeed, but they were colorful, 
curved, and not at all geometric, linear and formalized.
I  also  wonder  whether  Witkin  II’s  construction  of  his  dependent  variable  –  his 
description of  the modern aesthetic as geometric – is not too Bauhaus and Cubist? 
Was the aesthetic sensibility of  modernity really so flat,  colorless,  and geometric? 
When we see the physical-cum-aesthetic work environment of  the 1950s and 1960s 
faithfully recreated in the contemporary television drama  Madmen, for example, we 
are drawn to the curving lines of  men’s and women’s highly fashioned bodies, to the 
color of  clothing and fabric texture, to the brown, yellow and red sensuousness of 
interior  decoration,  to  the  boisterous  expressiveness  of  advertising,  and  to  the 
flagrant behavioral transgressions – well known in the informal organization of  the 
modern business world – of  alcohol and sex. The show’s creator Matthew Wiener 
has been highly  praised,  and his  massive  television audience mesmerized,  for his 
authentic  recreation of  the  iconic  surfaces  of  that  earlier,  mid-century  American 
time. 
Would somebody wish to claim that this aesthetic, too, was produced by the iron 
necessities of  organizational efficiency? It would be tendentious to do so. I would 
propose  a  different  line  of  causal  explanation,  one  that  points  to  the  (relative) 
autonomy of  the aesthetic and its ability to form feeling intelligence. The story would 
start  with the  nineteenth century  modernist  recovery of  the decentering “other”. 
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This includes mid-century obsessions with Japanese and Chinese woodcuts, which 
played such a formative role in subsequent Western art and architecture.  For the 
purposes of  the story I am telling here, however, I would emphasize the other of  the 
savage  and  barbaric,  which  incited  the  wild  colors  of  Fauvism  and  Picasso’s 
incorporation of  African forms. This story line in painting leads to the explosion of 
expressionism, whether representational or abstract. In modern architecture, it leads 
to  Frank  Lloyd  Wright  fanatically  fighting  the  geometrism  of  Le  Corbusier, 
continuing the craftsman tradition in his  “organic” modernism that produces the 
Guggenheim Museum and whose curves continue in Frank Gehry’s work today. 
Of  course, if  postmodernism were merely the product of  post-Fordism, then none 
of  this matters. I doubt very strongly that it is, and I am quite confident that Witkin I 
agrees.
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